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Waiting time is a rationing mechanism that is used in publicly funded healthcare systems. From an equity 
viewpoint, it is regarded as preferable to co-payments.  However, long waits are an indication of poor quality of 
service.  To our knowledge, this analysis is the first to benefit from individual-level data from administrative 
registers to investigate the distribution of waiting time with respect to socioeconomic status. Furthermore, it 
makes use of an extensive set of medical information that serves as indicators of patient need. Differences in 
waiting time by socioeconomic status are detected. For men there is a statistically highly significant negative 
association between income and waiting time. More educated women, i.e., having an education above 
compulsory schooling, experience lower waiting time than their fellow sisters with the lowest level of 
education. - 2 –     
 
1. Introduction 
Waiting time is a rationing mechanism that is used in many health care systems to establish 
equilibrium between the supply of and demand for health care services. From an equity 
viewpoint, it is regarded as preferable to co-payments, because the latter will exclude patients 
in need of treatment if they cannot afford it. However, waiting time causes pain, discomfort 
and anxiety to the individual patient, and prolonged waits are an indication of poor quality of 
service. Despite the great political interest in avoiding waiting time and the concern for 
equity, little is known about the distribution of waiting time with respect to socioeconomic 
status (SES). The scarcity of empirical evidence on this topic is due to lack of high quality 
data. In a recent paper, Siciliani and Verzulli (2009) apply survey data from nine countries to 
investigate the matter. For non-emergency surgery they find a negative and significant 
association between education and waiting times in Sweden, The Netherlands and Denmark, 
while the estimated effect of income was generally small. However, the drawbacks of survey 
data, such as small sample size and recall bias, have been pointed out in several yet 
unpublished analyses which employ administrative data in stead (Laudicella, Cookson, and 
Siciliani (2010), Carlsen and Kaarboe (2010), Tinghög et al.(2010)). 
The contribution of this analysis is its unique data set of individual-level data from 
reliable sources, which enables us to explore the distribution of waiting time in great detail. 
The individual-level data stem from administrative registers. In that respect, our paper is 
closest to the work of Tinghög et al.(2010), but our data set is larger, it has information on 
supply side factors and ,notably, on education as well as income. Our analysis focuses on one 
patient group, thus enabling us to control extensively for patient severity. This is crucial as 
health care policy in many countries mandates shorter waiting times for more severely ill 
patients (Siciliani and Hurst, 2005). The patient population studied is patients who had a 
primary hip replacement in Norway during the years 2000-2003.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a short description of the 
Norwegian health care system. Section 3 presents the data used, while the empirical method is 
explained in section 4. Results are reported and discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Institutional background 
Economic theory points to many pathways through which socioeconomic status can influence 
waiting time. According to human capital theory, productivity and wages are increasing in 
education, so is foregone labour income while waiting. Education may enhance individuals’ - 3 –     
knowledge of the functioning of the health care system. Furthermore, having more schooling 
may facilitate communication with medical personnel (Ishikawa and Yano, 2008). There may 
also be unobserved factors at play which are correlated both with education and waiting time. 
If individuals’ educational choice is credit-constrained, these characteristics could be picked 
up by the income variable in stead. It is commonly assumed that health improvement is a 
normal good, i.e., well-off individuals have, cet.par., a higher willingness-to-pay for reducing 
waiting time. Monetary travel costs to distant providers or high copayments may not be 
prohibitive to them.  
Norway’s health system is largely financed by general taxes. Most services are nearly 
free of charge at the point of usage, and this applies for elective hip operations. The large 
majority of in-patient treatment takes place at public hospitals. The private commercial 
involvement in this sector is negligible, and private health insurance was non-existing during 
the study period. For historic reasons there are quite a few not-for-profit private hospitals 
operating, some of which have specialized in elective operations.  
As of 1 January 2001, Norwegian patients have been granted a legal right to choose a 
provider for elective treatment
1. Patients may have to travel long distances to hospital. 
However, copayment for transportation is negligible, the equivalent of 27 Euros one way if 
the patient goes to a hospital in another health region, and about 16 Euros otherwise (payment 
data are for 2005). Information on waiting times has been made available via a free telephone 
service, which started when the reform was implemented in 2001.
2 Despite the free choice of 
provider, only one percent of the patients in 2003 and 2004 actually opt for elective treatment 
at hospitals outside their own health region, according to Christensen and Hem (2004). 
The patient is usually referred to a hospital by a GP. In order to assess whether a hip 
replacement, for example, is necessary, an examination is typically conducted by an 
orthopaedic surgeon at an outpatient clinic. The referral entails the patient being placed on a 
waiting list at a particular hospital. While waiting, the patient may choose to switch to another 
hospital, but will then be treated as a newcomer to the latter hospital’s waiting list, so there is, 
in effect, a certain lock-in mechanism at play. Waiting time is defined as the time elapsed 
between referral and the date of hospitalisation. 
                                                 
1 The right extends to all public hospitals in the country. It was taken as granted that “public hospitals” included 
non-commercial hospitals that had an agreement with hospital authorities (Ot.prp. no. 63 (2002-2003)). 
Hospitals affected by the law have a duty to “accept all patients who choose the hospital” (Ot.prp. no 63, 2002–
2003) but have a formal right to reject patients from another health region if they need to prioritize their own 
patients for reasons of capacity (Directorate for Health and Social Affairs, circular IS-12/2004). 
2 In May 2003, the Government launched an information service on the Internet. This study uses data for patients 
who entered onto the waiting list no later than June 2003. - 4 –     
The GP is likely to be better informed than the patient about the overall quality of 
different hospitals. As a result of the reform introduced on 1 June 2001, every Norwegian 
citizen is entitled to a specified GP, who is allocated a key role as advisor when patients 
choose a hospital. Most GPs are self-employed and they are financed partly by list patient 
capitation and partly by fee-for-service. It is difficult to see what self-interest a GP should 
have in making referrals to a specific hospital, except for possible loyalty and personal 
relations. Gathering information is time-consuming and therefore costly to him (Vrangbæk et 
al., 2007). The GP gets no direct compensation for such services, but the competition for 
patients introduced by a list patient system may give stronger incentives to engage in the 
matter (Carlsen, Iversen and Lurås, 2005). Nonetheless, patients may differ in their search 
cost. If the GP does not provide information about hospital choice, differences in patients’ 
search costs may be decisive for observed patient behaviour. 
Total hip replacements are carried out by the majority of Norwegian hospitals, but the 
number of operations per year varies significantly among them. Prior to 2002, public hospitals 
were owned by 19 different counties. Pursuant to the hospital reform implemented on 1 
January 2002, the specialized health care sector was organized as state owned enterprises 
within five regional health authorities, which are responsible for patients within the region. 
The government allocates its budget to regional health authorities, which are then free to 
decide how much to allocate to individual hospitals under their jurisdiction. Since 1997, 
hospital owners have been given economic incentives to attract patients, since part of their 
funding is based on activity level. The rest is given as a block grant. The proportion that is 
paid based on activity was 50% of the stipulated cost per diagnosis-related group (DRG) in 
1999-2001, 55% in 2002 and 60% in 2003.  
The difference between activity-based remuneration and marginal cost varies 
significantly both between and within DRGs. Until 2003, all hip replacements were defined in 
one category, DRG 209, with a stipulated average cost of about 13,700 euros. In 2003, a 
subcategory was introduced for complicated cases, for which the compensation per treatment 
was about 2,000 euros higher. This subcategory is scarcely present in our sample. Elective 
surgery, including hip replacements, is considered to be an economically and organizationally 
attractive activity for an orthopaedics department.
3 
 
                                                 
3 According to an internal report from one of the regional health authorities (also called “health regions”), 
elective orthopaedics is profitable to the orthopaedics department. Performing a high volume of operations gives 
status and attracts candidates for specialization (Helse Nord, 2003). - 5 –     
3. Data  
 
3.1. Construction of the data set 
The data set is a pooled cross-section obtained by merging data from four different sources. 
Details on these data sets and the exclusion criteria follow below.  
The source data are from The Norwegian Arthroplasty Register (hereafter NAR). 
Registrations in NAR are voluntary and based on registration forms that the surgeon 
completes immediately after an operation. Both public and private hospitals report to the 
register, which had a reporting rate of 98% of all hip replacements in 1999-2002 (Espehaug et 
al., 2006). This analysis uses data on primary hip replacement operations performed at 
Norwegian hospitals during the period 2000–2003 on patients 25 years of age or older. If an 
individual has had several primary hip operations during the study period (i.e., on both hips), 
only the first one is included. Thus, 22,771 operations performed on the same number of 
individuals are relevant for this analysis. NAR provides data on the date of operation, the 
hospital used, patients’ age and gender, and extensive medical information specifically related 
to the hip replacement. In addition to main diagnosis and number of secondary diagnosis, we 
include variables that reflect the patient’s history of hip operations over a long period; 
indicators for having had any hip operation prior to the hip replacement and for having 
another primary hip replacement after the one in question. Furthermore, there are indicators 
representing the medical reason for the primary hip replacement observed. 
Data on the individual’s level of education, income, number of children and marital 
status have been gathered from the registers of Statistics Norway. These two registers can be 
perfectly merged by means of the unique personal identification code. Waiting time data are 
provided by The Norwegian Patient Register (hereafter NPR), and we utilize only 
observations that had NSCP codes relevant for primary hip replacements within DRG 209. 
For each hospital stay there are data on the patient’s waiting time and home municipality, the 
name of the hospital, whether the stay was an emergency case or not, procedures executed, 
main diagnosis, secondary diagnosis etc. A Matrix of distances between all Norwegian 
municipalities provides information on driving distance by car in minutes, and makes it 
possible to identify the closest and next closest hospital in relation to the patient’s home 
municipality.  
An overview of the sample selection process is given in table 1. Data from the NPR are 
merged with the NAR data using the following variables; patient’s year of birth, gender, date - 6 –     
of operation, and hospital number. After matching, the combined data set consists of 17,871 
observations, which is 79% of the relevant part of the NAR data set.
4 Among these, 1,434 
observations lacked information on waiting time, and 112 on level of education. For fear of 
measurement errors, we have dropped observations that are outliers with respect to waiting 
time (in total 497 observations
5. After inspecting seasonal variations in entry onto waiting 
lists, we excluded observations where entry took place before November 1999 or later than 
June 2003, confer figure 1. Further details are provided in table 1. The procedure described 
above generates a data set of 13,348 individuals aged 25 and above.  
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents an overview of key variables and summary statistics by gender (for more 
comprehensive information on the data set, see appendix table 1, which reports for the mean 
individual). Waiting time varies substantially, with a mean of 173 days for men and 167 days 
for women. The dependent variable is defined as the log of waiting time and its distribution is 
shown in figure 2.  
The key explanatory variables are education and income. Education is represented by 
three binary indicators for levels of completed education: compulsory schooling, having some 
education after compulsory schooling and having completed three years of upper secondary 
schooling or more.
6 Income is measured by yearly gross income, which comprises all income 
from labour, private enterprise, pensions, sickness allowance as well as financial income. 
Yearly nominal income, on which we have data for the years 2000-2003, is deflated to year 
2000 price level. The data set makes it possible to explore several income concepts. 
Transitory income is represented by income the year prior to hip replacement, thus reducing 
the potential influence on income of inactivity during rehabilitation. Average income over 
several years serves as a proxy for permanent income. As waiting time observed is the result 
of supply and demand, it is important to control for supply factors as well. These and other 
controls are presented in the empirical analysis section below.  
                                                 
4 How well the two registers match varies among the institutions. Interest lies in whether some institututions are 
strongly under-represented or over-represented after the match compared to their share of operations in the NAR. 
Differences are traced, without any obvious explanation. The data set after matching is very similar to the pre-
matching NAR set with respect to mean and variation of sex, age and date of operation. One source of mismatch 
stems from the fact that bilateral hip replacements made during one hospital stay are counted as two observations 
with the NAR, but only one with the NPR. 
5 Outliers are defined in accordance with several other studies of waiting times in Norway (The Office of the 
Auditor General of Norway, 2003). 
6 For the younger part of the sample, compulsory school lasted nine years. The definition of levels of secondary 
schooling takes into account the fact that the length of compulsory schooling has increased over time. Thus it 
may be regarded as a measure of an individual’s level of education relative to his cohort. - 7 –     
The reference individual is a never-married woman (man) under the age of 50, who 
entered onto the waiting list in 1999, and whose highest level of education is compulsory 
schooling. Seventy per cent of the patients are women and their average age is 70 years, while 
men are on average 2,5 years younger. Women earned only 55 percent of men’s average 
income, and had a lower level of education as well: 58 percent had completed some education 
after compulsory schooling compared to 67 percent for men and only 19 percent (35 percent) 
had completed three years of upper secondary education or higher education. Because of 
restrictions made during data selection, only four percent of the sample entered onto the list in 
1999, about twenty-seven per cent in each of the years 2000, 2001, and 2002, and about 
fourteen per cent in 2003. Twenty-three (twenty-one) percent had their operation at a non-
profit, private hospital and about eight percent at a university hospital. The average distance 
to the hospital used was 1,24 (1,08) hours by car. Travel distances within Norway may be 
substantial; the maximum travel distance to the closest hospital is 7,7 hours in this data set. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
In order to investigate the relationship between SES and waiting time, we estimate an 












1 0 i MARITAL SES SUPPLY MED DEM WT ε + β + β + β + β + β + β =  
where WT is the log of waiting time of individual i, and the parameter vector of prime 
interest is  4 β , connected to SES which represents level of completed education and income. 
In the main specification, we include a dummy for having completed any education above 
compulsory schooling. Income is expressed as the log of gross income the year prior to entry 
at waiting list. DEM represents age and gender, and MED is a comprehensive vector of 
medical information, described in section 3. The SUPPLY vector contains data on the year in 
which the patient was placed on the list
7 as well as geographical information on county, 
regional health authority and the patient’s distance to the closest hospital which offers hip 
replacements. If a hospital is located in the municipality where the patient lives, the distance 
will be zero. In order to further reflect cost of access, we include distance to closest-next 
                                                 
7 Year dummies cover several aspects that are potentially important for waiting time and that have changed over 
time, e.g., health care sector reforms, hospitals’ total budget and the share assigned to activity based financing. 
We choose to include the year of entry to reflect the conditions at the point in time when the choice of hospital is 
possibly made, keeping in mind that there is a lock-in mechanism. Alternatively, one may include the year of 
operation.  - 8 –     
hospital, defined as the closest hospital outside of the patient’s municipality of residence. An 
indicator for university hospital is included to reflect that the more complicated cases are 
typically treated there, as well as an indicator for (non-commercial) private hospitals. As an 
indicator of patient choice we generate a dummy for bypassing the closest hospital. Patient’s 
opportunity set is mirrored by the distance to the next closest municipality hosting a hospital. 
Trends in waiting time are captured by time dummies. MARITAL represents the patient’s 
marital status and parenthood to children under the age of eighteen.  
Our choice of estimator is facilitated by our waiting time measure being a continuous 
variable (see the discussion in Siciliani and Verzulli, 2009). However, waiting is a duration 
and the distribution of days on the waiting list is heavily skewed to the left. Taking into 
account the fact that there are no zero values and no peaks in this distribution, we define the 
dependent variable to be the logarithm of days waited and apply an OLS specification. 
Having done this transformation, applying an OLS model is approximately equivalent to 
running a basic duration model (Carlsen and Kaarboe, 2010). Figure 2 displays the 
distribution of the dependent variable. 
Note that our data is at the individual level, which is very rare in the analysis of how 
waiting time varies by SES. Data on key variables are from administrative registers, thus 
reducing the risks of measurement error and avoiding small sample size which is a concern in 
surveys. 
 
5. Results and discussion  
Our interest lies in the association between waiting time and SES, and the data available allow 
us to investigate whether this relationship differs by gender. Control variables were added 
stepwise, and results from two of the most comprehensive specifications are reported in table 
3. We started with a very simple regression of waiting time on income, marital status and 
parenthood to young children. Then controls were included to reflect education, age, patient 
medical information, and time of entry onto waiting list, i.e., the specification labelled (I) in 
the table. Specification (II) takes into account supply side factors as well, such as hospital 
ownership (public versus private, non-commercial hospital), university hospital status, 
patient’s health region and county of residence, and distance to hospital. 
Separating the sample by gender renders interesting results. For key variables, the 
magnitude of the coefficients differs across specifications (some of which are not reported in 
table 3), but the statistical significance and sign remain the same: for women, there is clear - 9 –     
negative association between level of education and waiting time, whereas the income 
variable is insignificant. For men, the picture is nearly the opposite. Well-off men wait shorter 
for treatment, while the coefficient for male education, although negative as expected, is 
statistically insignificant once supply side factors are controlled for. Furthermore, inclusion of 
supply side covariates causes a sharp decrease in the magnitude of the coefficients for the 
income variable for men and the education variable for women. It should be noted that an 
estimation on the whole sample, with control for gender, will disguise the gender difference in 
the association between SES and waiting time, and thus lead to a misinterpretation of the 
results.
8 
Other things equal, an increase in income of NOK 10000 (1250 Euros) is associated 
with a shortening of waits of 48 days among men. Women who have completed some 
education above compulsory schooling experience on average 10 days shorter waits than their 
fellow sisters with compulsory schooling only. We have checked the robustness of this 
estimate in a number of ways, and results are reported in Appendix table 2. The following 
aspects have been examined: 
a) Whether the results are driven by very long waits. In the columns labelled A, the quintile 
with the highest waiting time, i.e., with waits above 245 days, was excluded. The coefficients 
of interest have the same sign but are of lower magnitude than with the full sample (-0.065 
versus -0,078 for male income and -0.049 versus -0.062 for female education level). 
However, despite the sample being smaller, the statistical significance remains the same. 
b) whether results are driven by patients at the upper end of the SES distribution. This aspect 
was investigated by excluding men in the highest income quintile and women having 
completed some higher education; i.e., 13 percent of all women in the sample. Results are 
reported in columns B and C of Appendix table 2. The income variable becomes less 
significant, otherwise, the qualitative results are unchanged. 
c) whether results depend on the definition of the SES variables. The indicator for educational 
level was redefined to reflect a level of at least 3 years of secondary education, in stead of any 
education above secondary schooling. This redefinition gave a small decrease in the absolute 
value of the coefficient for women (from 0,062 to 0,051). Furthermore, we replaced income 
the year prior to entry at the waiting list with average income. As could be expected, this gave 
                                                 
8 We have estimated table 3 specifications for the whole sample as well. For the mean individual, income is 
statistically significant at 5 % level in specification (I) but not in (II), while education remains statistically 
significant, even at 1 % level, across all specifications. - 10 –     
a moderate increase in the coefficient for male income (-0,086 versus -0,078). In sum, the 
qualitative results appear robust to these different definitions of the SES variables.  
Additionally, we have checked whether characteristics of the supply side may alter 
results. Previous research has shown that patients, given the right to choose hospital in 2001, 
make a trade-off between waiting time and distance to hospital (Monstad, Engesæter and 
Espehaug, 2007). In order to capture the patient’s opportunity set, we replaced actual distance 
to hospital with the distance to next-closest hospital, and even an indicator for bypassing the 
closest hospital. None of the changes made to supply side variables alter the results for 
income and education estimated in the main specification.  
Overall, we find the results for control variables to be reasonable. As shown in table 3, 
patients who travel one extra hour get a reduction in waiting time of 4.8 %. University 
hospital patient wait longer, and patients at private, non-commercial hospitals wait much 
shorter, perhaps because some of these hospitals specialize in elective surgery. There is a 
clear falling trend in waiting times, as can be seen from the year dummies. Inspecting patient 
characteristics, we find that older patients wait less, cet.par. For instance, a woman aged 80 
and above wait approximately 8 % less than her fellow sister aged 70. Patients who have a 
primary hip replacement on both hips during the study period constitute a special group, who 
experience considerably shorter waits for the first of the two operations, irrespective of 
gender. Some findings are gender-specific: men who have had a hip operation before the hip 
replacement (eight percent of all men) wait 15 percent longer. Among women, waiting time 
increases in comorbidites, which is somewhat surprising. For both genders, main diagnosis 
and medical reason for hip replacement is a major determinant of waiting times. While 
controlling for these variables, we do not report their coefficients to keep the presentation 
simple. Results not reported in the paper are available from the authors upon request. 
Our results contrast the findings in Siciliani and Verzulli (2009), who conclude that 
“Surprisingly, an increase in income of 10,000 Euro increases waits by 11% in Sweden.” 
There are many differences between the two studies. Nevertheless, in many respects, the 
Norwegian health care system bears similarities to the Swedish, and the average age is not 
very different in the two analyses (sixty-five versus sixty-nine years). With more detailed and 
reliable data and a larger sample, we find a negative relationship between waiting time and 
SES in Norwegian data. Furthermore, our study shows that this relationship is gender-
specific. It should be noted that within the cohorts which dominate our sample, many 
individuals, particularly women, were financially restricted in their choice of educational - 11 –     
level. Consequently, women who got some education are a more selected group than men at 
the same (low) level of education. It also appears reasonable that income is a better marker of 
SES for men than for women, given traditional gender roles and men’s much higher labour 
market participation. Furthermore, women with some education are much more concentrated 
in the health care sector than men, which may improve their access to relevant health market 
information. 
The exact mechanisms behind the negative association between SES and waiting time 
are difficult to trace. However, in this case it does not seem likely that patients’ labour market 
association when entering the waiting list is important, given the age composition of the 
patient population. Neither was private health insurance or use of commercial private 
hospitals an issue during the period studied. Possible explanations are that more well-off 
and/or more educated individuals communicate better with health care personnel. Their search 
costs may be lower, for instance because of better informed networks or because they are 
more apt in acquiring information about the functioning of the health care system. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The literature on socioeconomic differences in waiting time is scarce, in contrast to the great 
political interest in waiting time and the declared health policy aim of “equal treatment for 
equal need”. We claim that this analysis is a major contribution to the existing literature, 
because of the data set applied. Having relevant and reliable data on SES and a 
comprehensive set of controls for medical condition is a prerequisite for undertaking such an 
investigation. This analysis, which benefits from individual level data from administrative and 
high-quality health registers, detects socioeconomic differences in waiting time. Our measures 
of socioeconomic status are level of education and gross income, which is available over 
several years. We find that higher SES reduces waiting time both for men and women, but 
interestingly, the SES measure of importance varies by gender. For men there is a statistically 
highly significant negative association between income and waiting time, while educational 
level does not seem important. In contrast, more educated women, i.e., having an education 
above compulsory schooling, experience lower waiting time than their fellow sisters with the 
lowest level of education. The analysis proves that controlling for supply side factors is 
crucial when assessing the impact of income and education on waiting time. In addition, it is 
imperative that the sample size allows for a gender-specific analysis.  - 12 –     
The association estimated is of some magnitude, on average a woman who has 
completed at least some as opposed to no secondary education experiences a 6.2 per cent 
reduction in waiting time, which corresponds to a reduction of 10 days, cet.par. Among men, 
a rise in income of NOK 10,000 (about 1250 Euros) is associated with a reduction in waiting 
time of 48 days for primary hip replacement. 
A caveat should be made that the population studied, although one of the largest within 
elective surgery, may not be representative of the hospital patient population in general. - 13 –     
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Figure 1. Seasonal variation in entry to the waiting list.  
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Figure 2. The distribution of the dependent variable, log of waiting time.- 16 –     
Tables  
 
T1. Sample selection 
  No. of observations 
No. of primary hip operations for which waiting time data is potentially available  17 879 
Restrictions and missing on key variables:   
missing on patient's home municipality   -8 
missing on waiting time  -1 434 
waiting time is less than 2 days  -233 
waiting time exceeds 999 days  -264 
the patient's age when listed is below 25   -12 
the patient was registered on waiting list later than June 2003  -761 
the patient was registered on waiting list prior to November 1999  -1 675 
compulsory schooling is not completed   -30 
missing on level of education  -112 
missing on marital status  -2 
Estimated sample  13 348 
 - 17 –     
 
T2. Descriptive statistics 
  men (4009 obs)  women (9339 obs.) 
  Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev.
Waiting  time,  days  173.7 135.6 166.7 127.6 
      
age when registered on waiting list  67.9  10.9  70.3  10.4 
Income and education:      
gross income year (t-1), price-deflated,  NOK  275921 333923 156330 132247 
average gross income 2000-2003, price-deflated, NOK  273179  333394  158827  127560 
1 if any education completed above compulsory schooling 0.67  0.47  0.58  0.49 
1 if completed at least 3 years of secondary  education  0.35 0.48 0.19 0.39 
Main diagnosis, no.of comorbidities, register-specific information     
Marital status, having children under the age of 18       
Time and place, supply:      
Patient's health region and county          
1 if registered on waiting list in 1999  0.04  0.21  0.04  0.19 
1 if registered on waiting list in 2000  0.27  0.44  0.27  0.44 
1 if registered on waiting list in 2001  0.27  0.44  0.27  0.45 
1 if registered on waiting list in 2002  0.28  0.45  0.28  0.45 
1 if registered on waiting list in 2003  0.13  0.34  0.14  0.35 
1  if  private  hospital  0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42 
1 if university hospital  0.08  0.27  0.07  0.26 
Distance to hospital, hours by car  1.24  2.36  1.08  2.02 
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T3. Results – waiting time and socioeconomic status 
  men women 
 (I)  (II)  (I)  (II) 
loginclist -0.117
*** -0.078
*** -0.002  0.006 

















 (-5.88)  (-5.87)  (-7.58)  (-7.09) 
v2 0.126
* 0.151
** 0.066  0.057 
 (1.67)  (2.08)  (1.43)  (1.28) 
bdiag_count 0.006  0.007  0.027
*** 0.027
*** 
























 (-10.19)  (-10.10)  (-13.78)  (-14.62) 
private   -0.237
***  -0.192
*** 
   (-5.06)    (-6.37) 
univhosp   0.198
***  0.131
*** 
   (3.29)    (3.32) 
dist   -0.047
***  -0.048
*** 
   (-7.94)    (-10.85) 
Control for:        
patient health region  no  yes  no  yes 
county of residence  no  yes  no  yes 
marital status  yes  yes  yes  yes 
having children <18  yes  yes  yes  yes 
main diagnosis  yes  yes  yes  yes 
operation duration  yes  yes  yes  yes 
reason for hip replacement  yes  yes  yes  yes 
calendar month   yes  yes  yes  yes 
N 3943  3943  9223  9223 
r2_a 0.102  0.171  0.099  0.166 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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APPENDIX 
 
App. Table 1. Descriptive and summary statistics 
variable name  Obs Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Dependent variable:         
wait  Waiting time, days  13348  169 130 2 994
logwait  log of waiting time, days  13348  4.821 0.872 0.693 6.902
Age and gender:         
female  1 if female, otherwise 0  13348  0.700 0.458 0 1
listage  age when registered on waiting list  13348  69.626 10.586 25 98
Medical information:         
multprim  1 if primary hip replacement on both hips within period studied 13348  0.098 0.297 0 1
v2  1 if has had any hip operation prior to hip replaceme  13348  0.100 0.301 0 1
v12_1  1 if reason for hip replacement is unspecified  13284  0.026 0.161 0 1
v12_2  1 if reason for hip replacement is spondyloarthrithis (Bechterew) 13284  0.003 0.053 0 1
v12_3  1 if reason for hip replacement is idiopathic osteoarthritis of the hip   13284  0.784 0.412 0 1
v12_4  1 if reason for hip replacement is rheumatoid arthritis   13284  0.024 0.154 0 1
v12_5 
1 if reason for hip replacement is secondary to Perthes’ disease or slipped 
capital femoral epiphysis (SCFE)   13284  0.012 0.107 0 1
v12_6 
1 if reason for hip replacement is secondary to developmental dysplasia of 
the hip (DDH)  13284  0.070 0.256 0 1
v12_7  1 if reason for hip replacement is secondary to DDH with dislocation 13284  0.003 0.055 0 1
v12_8  1 if reason for hip replacement is secondary femoral neck fracture. 13284 0.078 0.268 0 1
hd_m059  1 if main diagnosis is M059  13348  0.007 0.082 0 1
hd_m160  1 if main diagnosis is M160  13348  0.219 0.414 0 1
hd_m161  1 if main diagnosis is M161  13348  0.567 0.496 0 1
hd_m162  1 if main diagnosis is M162  13348  0.018 0.134 0 1
hd_m163  1 if main diagnosis is M163  13348  0.027 0.164 0 1
hd_m165  1 if main diagnosis is M165  13348  0.014 0.119 0 1
hd_m166  1 if main diagnosis is M166  13348  0.010 0.099 0 1
hd_m167  1 if main diagnosis is M167  13348  0.019 0.137 0 1
hd_m169  1 if main diagnosis is M169  13348  0.030 0.171 0 1
hd_s720  1 if main diagnosis is S720  13348  0.007 0.085 0 1
hd_T841  1 if main diagnosis is T841  13348  0.009 0.095 0 1
hd_T931  1 if main diagnosis is T931  13348  0.025 0.156 0 1
bdiag_count  Number of secondary diagnoses  13348  0.865 1.239 0 7
optime  Duration of hip operation, minutes  13229  98 29 19 507
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App. Table 1. Descriptive and summary statistics, cont. 
Time and place, supply:         
list99  1 if registered on waiting list in 1999  13348  0.039 0.194 0 1
list00  1 if registered on waiting list in 2000  13348  0.268 0.443 0 1
list01  1 if registered on waiting list in 2001  13348  0.273 0.446 0 1
list02  1 if registered on waiting list in 2002  13348  0.283 0.451 0 1
list03  1 if registered on waiting list in 2003  13348  0.137 0.344 0 1
pregion  Patient's health region (by patmunno)  13348  2.492 1.409 1 5
pcounty  Patient's home county (by patmunno)  13348  9.677 5.598 1 20
hregion  Hospital's health region (by hospmunno)  13348  2.461 1.411 1 5
hcounty  Hospital's location, county (by hospmunno)  13348  9.531 5.657 1 20
private  1 if private hospital  13348  0.221 0.415 0 1
univhosp  1 if hospital used is university hospital  13348  0.074 0.262 0 1
dist  Distance to hospital, travel time by car, hours  13348  1.126 2.1 0 44.1
cl_dist  Distance to closest hospital, travel time by car, hours  13348  0.488 0.8 0 7.7
clnext_dist  Distance to closest-next hospital municipality, travel time by car, hours  13348  1.344 1.3 0.2 9.5
bypass  1 if closest hospital is bypassed  13348  0.402 0.490 0 1
Income:          
inclist  price-deflated gross income, the year prior to wating list registration, NOK  13348  192261 220741 0 10100000
incav  average gross income 2000-2003, price-deflated, NOK  13348  193178 217970 0 12000000
rbrto_2000  gross income 2000, price level of 2000, NOK  13347  190342 215296 0 10100000
rbrto_2001  gross income 2001, price level of 2000, NOK  13345  189586 191151 0 6971597
rbrto_2002  gross income 2002, price level of 2000, NOK  13275  197437 254142 0 12500000
rbrto_2003  gross income 2003, price level of 2000, NOK  13149  197289 314255 0 20500000
Education:           
edul2  1 if education completed=level 2  13348  0.394 0.489 0 1
edu_above2  1 if any education completed above compulsory schooling  13348  0.606 0.489 0 1
edu_above3  1 if completed at least 3 years of secondary education  13348  0.239 0.427 0 1
Marital status, children:         
single  1 if single  13348  0.070 0.255 0 1
married  1 if married or registered partner  13348  0.568 0.495 0 1
widow  1 if widow(er) or if partner is deceased  13348  0.271 0.445 0 1
divorced  1 if divorced or separated  13348  0.091 0.288 0 1
kids  1 if parent to children<18 years of age, year prior to wait  13348  0.147 0.354 0 1- 21 –     
App. Table 2. Robustness checks 
 men  women 


















* 0.010 0.007 
 (-2.94)  (-1.82)  (1.14)  (0.71) 
edu_above2 -0.036  -0.014  -0.049
*** -0.060
*** 












 (-4.32)  (-4.99)  (-4.02)  (-6.18) 
v2 0.144
* 0.192
* 0.039  0.038 
 (1.92)  (1.93)  (0.84)  (0.79) 
bdiag_count 0.004  0.008  0.015
** 0.030
*** 
 (0.32)  (0.60)  (2.09)  (4.01) 
list00 -0.088  -0.259
*** -0.088  -0.217
*** 
























 (-3.45)  (-3.37)  (-4.54)  (-6.08) 
univhosp 0.029  0.200
*** -0.020  0.127
*** 






 (-6.80)  (-6.87)  (-9.33)  (-10.47) 
N 3097  2440  7440  8025 
r2_a 0.122  0.170  0.126  0.165 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
 
Notes:  
1. The following exclusion criteria have been applied: In specification (A); observations within the highest quintile of waiting time, in 
(B), the highest quintile of income, and in (C), having completed some higher education, i.e., above three years of upper secondary 
schooling. 
2. The same controls have been used across specification (A)-(C). Included, but not reported in the table, are controls for patient health 
region and county of residence, marital status and parenthood to children under the age of 18, main diagnosis, operation duration, 
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